A growing need for a digital identity

Identity is a precondition for participating in society by facilitating access to health and welfare systems, education, and financial and government services. With the accelerating digital transformation, a rapidly growing number of transactions is conducted online, creating an ever-more-urgent need for a digital identity.

Based on verified personal information, a digital identity can be defined as a set of digitally captured and stored attributes such as name, date of birth or gender coupled with credentials that are linked to a unique identifier to identify a person and thereby facilitate transactions in the digital world. In the future, the core digital identity attributes may be complemented with additional attributes and documents from all areas of life such as social security number, medical records or school diplomas, catalysing the digital transformation for countless use-cases ranging from opening a bank account and taking out an insurance policy to filing a tax return.

  • Before we were aware how extensively the internet would proliferate into our everyday lives, the internet was built without a native identity layer. In the absence of a standardised way to identify people or entities, every website started to create its own digital identity solution with its own local accounts and passwords. As a result, people collect in their digital interactions a multitude of digital identities ranging from different e-mail accounts and social media profiles to e-banking accounts.

    The ability to use the internet without revealing your real identity is not necessarily bad. When using certain digital services, like sharing content on social media, a pseudonym is more than sufficient. In some instances, such as exercising the right to freedom of expression in an authoritarian state, remaining anonymous is key. In many other cases, for example when opening a bank account or taking out an insurance policy, companies are required to know the identity of their counterparty by law.

    Despite the positive aspects, it is clear that today’s fragmented digital identity landscape, with its large number of accounts and passwords, comes at a cost. For users, having an unmanageable number of accounts and passwords is time-consuming and inconvenient, as they have to register their identity data repeatedly with every new counterparty and often lose access to their accounts. From a security perspective, today’s fragmented digital identity landscape is unregulated and characterised by a daunting number of heterogeneous and unregulated security levels. Faced with this complexity, many users neglect security concerns and use the same simple password across many different services.

    By contrast, a single digital identity has the potential to significantly improve both user experience and convenience by making a wide range of digital services accessible in a seamless fashion and rendering repeated registration obsolete. In addition, users will be able to regain control over their digital identity by being able to manage which attributes they want to share with which counterparty. At the same time, “putting all your eggs in one basket” and entrusting a single digital identity ecosystem with managing your digital identity leads to an elevated cluster risk in case of an attack, technical failure or malicious behaviour. Despite these security concerns, the overall security situation is expected to improve for the average user thanks to lower complexity as well as standardised and clearly regulated security levels across the entire digital identity ecosystem.

    From a business point of view, the identification of the same customer is redundantly replicated with every company a customer has a business relationship with. This means every company has to develop and maintain their own costly and often largely paper-based identification processes for onboarding new clients as well as authenticating existing clients in order to provide services to them. In addition, every business has to periodically review and update the customer data to reflect any changes.
    With this in mind, a universally usable digital identity represents an opportunity for companies to reduce risks and realise considerable cost savings by increasing process efficiency and de-facto outsourcing customer identification. Businesses can increase their conversion rates by lowering the threshold to conclude a transaction and by launching new products and services with a superior user experience to help them gain a competitive edge.

Understanding digital identity

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Digital identity ecosystem

The provision and usage of digital identity involves a number of interdependent actors, who collectively form a digital identity ecosystem. Confronted with increasing complexity due to growing transaction volumes and increasing customer expectations, any successfully digital identity ecosystem requires a collaborative effort across organisations and industries.

Across all stages of the digital identity lifecycle, every actor takes on certain tasks or operations that are associated with their role. But digital identity systems can come in many different forms. The number of defined roles and the scope of their activities largely depend on the specific requirements of a country’s legal framework and the players involved.

Hence, a set of archetypical roles in a digital identity ecosystem will be introduced. The first three core roles Identity Owner, Identity Provider and Relying Party represent the minimum for any digital identity ecosystem and are also covered in Switzerland’s emerging regulatory framework (see section 4). The three roles Broker, Attribute Provider and Service Provider are labelled as ecosystemdependent roles as they can be incorporated in a digital identity ecosystem as needed. It is important to note that these generic roles can be further subdivided to accommodate different circumstances and requirements.

In practice, the key question when designing a digital identity ecosystem is whether to adopt a model that is broker centric or Identity Provider centric.


Identity Owner (IO)

• Owner and controller of a digital identity

• Uses their digital identity to conveniently and securely identify themselves in digital transactions

• Natural person (e.g. Alice or Bob)


Identity provider (IdP)

• Responsible for the provision of a digital identity

• Verifies an individual’s identity and issues the corresponding digital credentials to ascertain their digital identity

• Government agency (e.g. passport office) or government-recognised organisation (e.g. bank)


Relying Party (RP)

• Relies on a digital identity for onboarding of new customers and authentication of existing customers

• Integrates digital identity in its operating model to improve the user experience and increase efficiency

• Industry-agnostic role including businesses (e.g. online shops) and government agencies (e.g. tax offices)



• Ensures interoperability in the ecosystem and enhances privacy by preventing tracking actions across different roles

• Intermediates the data flow between the Identity Provider and the Relying Party

• Neutral organisation (e.g. infrastructure provider)


Attribute Provider (AP)

• Offers additional attributes that are not collected by the Identity Provider during registration

• Additional attributes allow Relying Parties to accelerate their digital processes and offer more tailored services

• Government agency (e.g. fedpol), state-affiliated company (e.g. Post) or private company (e.g. Telco)


Service provider

• Offers electronic trust services such as digital signatures

• Electronic trust services allow providers to enhance and expand the interactions and services within the ecosystem

• Private company (e.g. Telco)


  Core roles   Ecosystem-dependent roles

Identity Provider centric

In an Identity Provider-centric model, the data flows directly from the Identity Provider to the Relying Party, and vice-versa. Hence, the actions of the Identity Owner can be traced across the ecosystem. For example, the Identity Provider could track how often the Identity Owner logs into an online casino, while the casino might register which institution the Identity Owner has registered their digital identity with.

Broker centric

In a broker-centric model, an identity broker intermediates the data flow between the Identity Provider and the Relying Party to ensure interoperability and enhance the system’s overall privacy by “blinding” the Identity Provider and Relying Party from one another. This means the Identity Owner’s actions cannot be traced.

However, channelling the entire data flow through the broker as a central authority introduces a single point of failure and creates a honeypot with a vast quantity of valuable data. Implementing a broker based on a private blockchain like in the case of the Canadian digital identity solution (developed by SecureKey) could offer a solution to this issue and meet the so-called triple-blindness requirement.

Digital identity lifecycle model

The provision and usage of digital identity is not a single, one-time event, but rather a sequence of (recurring) events, which can be conceptualised in a lifecycle model. In the following, a generic end-to-end digital identity lifecycle will be introduced based on a broker-centric digital identity ecosystem.


The registration stage initiates the digital identity lifecycle and can be further subdivided into claiming and verifying digital identity. (1) In a first step, the Identity Owner registers their digital identity by entering a set of vider’s premises or through an equivalent online presence such as a video identification (see also FINMA Circular 2016/7 Video and online identification).

Depending on the design of the digital identity ecosystem, (3b) the Identity Owner can shorten the registration process and leverage an existing business relationship. Identity Providers (i.e. banks) can reuse the verified identity data they have already collected to meet their Know-Your-Customer (KYC) and Anti-Money-Laundering (AML) obligations.

required identity attributes in the Identity Provider’s web or mobile application. The attributes can be categorised as biographical data such as name, gender, address, biometrical information (e.g. fingerprint, iris scan) and / or additional data formats such as behavioural data. (2) Depending on the chosen security level, the Identity Owner has to set up an appropriate authentication method. In the case of 2 Factor Authentication (2FA), this includes a first as well as a second factor of their choice. (3) The completed application is then submitted to the Identity Provider.


In a next step, (4) the Identity Owner requests verification of their identity data. In response, (5) the Identity Provider verifies the claimed identity against existing data. This is necessary to ascertain whether the claimed identity exists and is unique (deduplication). In most cases, the
verification is based on at least one official government ID. Depending on the desired security level, this step is executed as face-to-face verification at the Identity Pro-


Once the Identity Owner’s identity is successfully verified, (6) the Identity Provider processes the Identity Owner’s application and (7) issues the credentials in the form of a digital identity. With the issuance of credentials, the Identity Provider ascertains the Identity Owner’s identity by authoritatively linking the digital identity via a unique identifier to at least one authenticator. Credentials can be categorised as something you know (e.g. password or PIN), something you are (e.g. biometrical information such as a fingerprint) or something you have (e.g. ID card or security token).


(8) The Identity Owner can now use their digital identity to access and request digital services, such as signing into the web portal of an airline to purchase a flight ticket. (9) In order to provide the required service, the Relying Party needs to authenticate the requestor. In a broker-centric digital identity ecosystem, the Identity Owner is redirected for the purpose of authentication to the broker’s mobile or web portal. At this point, the Identity Owner is asked to (10) select their preferred Identity Provider for this transaction, (11) present one or more (digital) credentials to prove their identity and (12) give consent to share the requested identity attributes with the Relying Party on a one-time or time-bound basis. As soon as the authentication request is fully approved by the Identity Owner, (13) the broker requests the desired identity attributes
from the chosen Identity Provider and (14) transmits the received data to the requesting Relying Party for authentication of the Identity Owner.

Authorisation and service delivery

(15) After having authenticated the requestor, (16) the Relying Party checks as part of the authorisation process which rights are associated with the user’s digital identity. If the result of the authorisation is positive, the transaction can be approved and (17) the requested service is delivered to the Identity Owner.

Digital identity in Switzerland: Where do we stand today?

Acknowledging the need for a digital identity, the Federal Department of Police started working on a concept for an electronic Identification Document (eID) in 2013. Mirroring the physical world, this initial approach assumed the issuance of an electronic or digital identity to be solely a state responsibility. In 2015, the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) initiated a broad stakeholder consultation involving cantons, industry associations and major companies. The results as well as insights from similar initiatives in other countries suggested that state-developed digital identity solutions lead to comparatively higher IT costs and are not flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing market needs and technological advancements.

Based on these findings, the Federal Council announced in early 2016 a division of tasks and responsibilities between state and market: market actors will develop and run digital identity systems based on the latest technology, while the government will provide the corresponding regulatory framework, certify private Identity Providers and provide verified identification data including a unique identifier.

The consultation period on the Draft Federal Act on Electronic Identification Services (D-eID Act) took place between February 2017 and November 2017. The role of the state remained a highly controversial topic among the 62 respondents as many of them rejected the idea of the private sector being in charge of issuing digital identity. Not surprisingly, ensuring the highest level of security and privacy was a priority for all stakeholders.

At the Swiss Digital Day in November 2017, a consortium of nine major Swiss companies announced the launch of the initiative SwissID to develop a single digital identity for the Swiss market. Adopting a gradual approach, SwissID aims to create an entire ecosystem offering a suite of different identity services ranging from authentication to electronic signature.

Shortly after this, the Swiss Post started migrating all their user accounts to a SwissID solution with basic login functionality. Despite receiving mixed reactions from Post customers, the SwissID consortium was able to establish a substantial user base right from the start. In March 2018, SwissSign Group AG was founded to advance the development of SwissID. Today, the basic SwissID can also be used as a single login with other companies like Blick, Bilanz, St. Galler Kantonalbank or the Canton of Graubünden. SBB, the Canton of Zug, Mobiliar and AXA Wintherthur are expected to follow soon, among others.

In early summer 2018, two other Swiss digital identity solutions made a name for themselves. Following a fourmonth pilot phase, the Canton of Schaffhausen permanently introduced its own digital identity solution in the shape of eID+.

Developed in cooperation with the Zurich-based startup Procivis, eID+ allows its users to access a growing number of e-government services. In April 2019, Procivis announced a partnership with the electronic signature provider Skribble to combine digital identity with legally binding electronic signatures.

Living up to its reputation as Crypto Valley, in November 2017 the city of Zug started running a pilot with the world’s first blockchain-based digital identity. Leveraging uPort’s technology stack, the IT company ti&m implemented the ZugID as a so-called self-sovereign identity. Being independent of any form of centralised control, the concept of self-sovereign identity aims to grant the user full autonomy and control over their identity. In June 2018, the ZugID was successfully used for a non-binding referendum.

In the 2019 spring session, the National Council endorsed the Draft Federal Act on Electronic Identification Services (D-eID Act) (see section 4 for more details), and thus took an important step towards a state-recognised electronic identity. In the 2019 summer session, the Council of States followed suit and passed the bill.

In view of the steadily increasing number of transactions processed digitally, the need for an electronic identity itself was largely undisputed in both chambers. However, the regulation’s basic thrust of assuming a division of roles between the state and the private sector was a point of contention in the debate in the Swiss parliament. Many politicians consider the issuance of physical as well as digital means of identification to be an exclusive task of the Swiss Confederation. Despite these concerns, the new legislation intends to combine the confidence building effect of state recognition and private-sector dynamism to facilitate a secure and user-friendly solution and thus ensure the success of the eID. The bill is not expected to enter into force until 2020/2021 at the earliest, unless a referendum is held.

These recent developments in the market – but also from the government – indicate that digital identity is gaining momentum in Switzerland. Hence, it is not so much a question of whether a digital identity solution will be introduced on the national scale, but rather when it will be introduced and what a successful model will look like.

Draft Federal Act on Electronic Identification Services (D-eID Act)

The Draft Federal Act on Electronic Identification Services (D-eID Act) creates the legal basis for a staterecognised electronic identity in Switzerland and enables natural persons to identify themselves securely and easily in electronic business transactions with companies and authorities. The bill regulates the entire lifecycle of electronic means of identification from issuance to revocation and defines the rights and obligations of the various actors in the ecosystem of an electronic identity. The following figure illustrates the key pillars of the D-eID Act and elaborates on the associated regulatory provisions.

Roles and responsibilities

In section 2.1, a set of archetypical roles in a generic digital identity ecosystem were introduced. In the case of Switzerland’s emerging digital identity ecosystem, the Draft Federal Act on Electronic Identification Services clearly defines and regulates the relevant ecosystem roles and the associated rights and responsibilities.

Swiss citizens and foreigners with a valid ID as specified in the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (FNIA), or foreigners whose identity can be proved in a special procedure, are eligible for an eID and can act as Identity Owner. The eID is personal, non-transferrable and voluntary. The owner of an eID has to exercise a duty of care to prevent abuse of their eID.

While issuing an ID is traditionally a sovereign task of state authorities, the Draft Federal Act on Electronic Identification Services (D-eID Act) assumes collaboration between the state and the private sector to provide digital identity. In this process, the trust-building effect of state recognition is combined with the market’s flexibility and technological expertise to ensure the rapid proliferation of the eID in Switzerland.

Hence, private companies have been entrusted with the provision of digital or electronic identity (eID). To issue an eID, Identity Providers are required to obtain formal recognition from the newly created federal eID Commission (EIDCOM). Recognition is granted for three years and requires compliance with a number of (operational) requirements such as, for example, entry in the commercial registry, skilled staff, compliance with the security requirements for the eID systems, or reporting to the authorities.

Despite the aforementioned division of responsibility, the state still plays a pivotal role in the digital identity ecosystem. With EIDCOM, an independent federal organisation will be created to monitor compliance with the Draft Federal Act on Electronic Identification Services and to take the necessary decisions to ensure a smooth-functioning eID ecosystem. Among other tasks, EIDCOM is responsible for recognising Identity Providers and publishing a list containing all recognised Identity Providers, as well as maintaining an information system to support their activities.

The Federal Office of Police (fedpol) is responsible for verifying the applicant’s identity and providing verified personal identification data to the Identity Provider, as well as maintaining an information system to support fedpol’s activities.

Relying Parties need a contractual agreement with the Identity Provider defining the desired security level as well as organisational and technical processes in order to be able to use the eID as a means of identification. Aiming at interoperability within the ecosystem, the eID Act
obliges Relying Parties to accept any eID for the required security level. The eID registration number, which is issued by fedpol, can be used for identification purposes.


Identity Owner

• Requirements for applying for an eID: (Art. 3)

a. Swiss citizens with valid ID

b. Foreigners with valid ID based on FNIA

c. Foreigners whose identity can be proved in a special procedure

• The eID is personal, non-transferrable (Art. 12) and voluntary (Art. 3)

• A duty of care applies to the owner to prevent abuse (Art. 12)


Identity Provider (IdP)

• Issuing eIDs requires formal recognition from eID-Commission (EIDCOM) (Art. 13)

• Identity Providers ensure interoperability of their eID solutions

• Recognition is granted for three years (Art. 14) and requires meeting (operational) requirements such as such as skilled staff, data protection & security and reporting (Art. 15)


Relying Party (RP)

• Relying Parties need a contractual agreement with the Identity Provider to define security level as well as organisational and technical processes (Art. 20)

• Relying Parties can use the eID registration number for identification (Art 21)

• Relying Parties are required to accept any eID for the required security level (Art. 22)


Role of the state

Like in the physical world, the state assumes a pivotal role in the digital identity ecosystem:

• The federal office police (fedpol) is responsible for identity verification, providing verified personal identification data to the Identity provider (Art. 6) and assigning the Identity Owner a unique eID registration number

• The EIDCOM is responsible for the IdP recognition and publishing a list with all IdPs (Art. 25) as well as maintaining an information system to support their activities (Art .24)


Security levels

• 3 different security levels: Low, Substantial, High (Art.4)

• Principal of downward compatibility (Art. 4): An eID issued with a higher security level can also be used, if a lower level is required

• The security levels differ by the number of personal identification attributes (Art. 5) as well as the rules for issuance, usage and operation (Art. 6)


Data protection

In some aspects, the data protection provisions of the eID Act go beyond the Federal Act on Data Protection:

• Processing of personal identification data is limited to the purpose of identification as long as the eID is valid (Art. 9)

• The transfer of personal identification data is limited to the necessary minimum and requires consent (Art. 16)

• Personal Identification data, usage data and other data have to be kept segregated (Art. 9)



• An eID is issued by the Identity Provider together with an authentication mean after the fedpol has verified the applicant’s identity and assigned him an eID registration number (Art. 6)

• An eID can be temporarily blocked by the IdP for example in the event of suspected fraud or loss of the password

• The fedpol can revoke the eID registration number, if the eID is no longer used on a permanent basis



• The fedpol and the EIDCOM can charge fees on a pay-per-use basis for their provisions and services. The Federal Council specifies the fees in an ordinance and considers whether an IdP charges a fee for issuing an eID. (Art. 27) • Queries regarding the validity of an eID are free of charge (Art. 27)

Security levels and data protection

Security is a key concern when it comes to electronic identity. The Draft Federal Act on Electronic Identification Services (D-eID Act) differentiates between three security levels for the eID, as not all business processes have identical security requirements. In practice, overly strict security measures can be perceived as cumbersome and impede the mass-adoption of digital identity. As illustrated above, the security levels mainly differ in terms of the number of personal identification attributes, the attribute update frequency and the rules for registration and authentication, as well as the scope of application.

The security level low contains only basic attributes and is sufficient for online shopping (including age verification) or logging into a citizen portal. With more attributes and higher security standards for registration and authentication, the security level substantial is suitable for taking out an insurance policy online or opening a bank account online. Designed for the highest protection against the threat of identity fraud and identity modification, the security level high can be used for the most sensitive services like e-voting.

When an electronic identity is issued and used, sensitive and personal data is processed. Data protection and data security therefore enjoy the highest priority in the Swiss parliament. This is also reflected in the Federal Council’s draft. In certain areas, the Draft Federal Act
on Electronic Identification Services goes beyond the current level of protection of the Swiss Data Protection Act. For example, the Identity Provider may only pass on personal identification data to Relying Parties (e.g. online shops) for which the Identity Owner has consented. The Identity Provider must delete protocol data resulting from usage of the eID after six months. In addition, personal identification data, usage data and other data must be kept segregated. The Swiss Data Protection Act is also currently undergoing a total revision, and this could have important implications for the eID when it comes into force.

Lifecycle and fees

The eID Act regulates important steps of the digital identity lifecycle such as registration, blocking or revocation of the eID. In order to obtain an eID, the Identity Owner first has to apply for an eID with the Identity Provider. After an initial screening, the application is transmitted to fedpol for verification of the identity based on identity data in existing government registries. Subject to successful verification and the user’s consent, fedpol transfers the applicant’s personal identification data and the assigned eID registration number to the Identity Provider. By issuing a means of authentication to the Identity Provider, the Identity Provider activates the eID for use. In the event of suspected fraud or loss of the password, the Identity Provider can temporarily block an eID. If an eID is no longer used, fedpol can revoke the eID registration number permanently.

Fedpol as well as EIDCOM can charge fees for their services based on a pay-per-use model to finance their expenses. The Federal Council will specify the detailed fee model in an ordinance and take into account whether the Identity Providers provide their services free of charge. The fees for initial transfer of personal identification data during the issuance process can be waived to accelerate market adoption. For any further transfer, a fee in the double-digit centime range will be charged. Queries to check the validity of an eID are free of charge.

Main challenges for digital identity in Switzerland

A user perspective: Building trust in digital identity

Trust plays an essential role in the adoption process of digital identity, as experience with recent examples like e-commerce, e-banking and mobile banking shows. In the face of an increasing number of cyber threats ranging from data breaches and fraud to identity theft, users’ concerns regarding the security and privacy of their identity data are among the primary barriers to the adoption of e-commerce and digital identity alike.

In the absence of existing knowledge or experience regarding digital identity, trust is a prerequisite to reduce the perceived security and privacy risks associated with the usage of such a new technology. If all actions could be executed with total certainty and there were no (perceived) risks, no trust would be needed. Providing the user with the necessary guarantees that their identity data will be protected is of paramount importance to gain and maintain the user’s trust. With only a single incident, the user’s trust might be irrevocably lost.

In today’s fragmented digital identity landscape, the Identity Owner has to manage a multitude of unregulated digital identities issued by different organisations. Despite heterogeneous and largely non-transparent security levels, the Identity Owner has to trust all these organisations with the protection of their identity data in order to transact online.

When adopting a government-recognised digital identity like Swiss eID, the Identity Owner only has to trust a single digital identity ecosystem. Despite an elevated cluster risk, relying on a single Identity Provider will be more secure for the average user as the currently heterogeneous and unregulated security levels would be standardised across the ecosystem, helping to increase the overall security for the Identity Owner.

Besides the individual user’s tendency to trust, structural assurances such as a strong regulatory framework (see section 4) or a best-in-class security and privacy framework are important determinants to build trust in a digital identity ecosystem. Building trust, however, is time-consuming and costly as it is based on long-term relationships and cumulative experience that provide the user with a sense of familiarity. Therefore, state agencies, state-affiliated companies as well as certain private actors such as banks or insurance companies benefit from their track record of handling sensitive data and are ideally positioned to leverage their reputation to instil trust in the digital identity ecosystem.

A business perspective: Succeeding in a two-sided market

For both customer groups in a two-sided digital identity market – Identity Owners as well as Relying Parties – the utility of a digital identity system is a function of the number of participants on the other market side allowing them to realise positive network effects. In other words, Identity Owners are only willing to register for a digital identity if they can use it universally. For Relying Parties, integrating a digital identity solution into their systems and processes only pays off if they can reach a high number of customers and prospects. This means that strategies to solve the chicken-and-egg problem in Switzerland’s emerging digital identity ecosystem should be directed at both Identity Owners and Relying Parties.

Monetary subsidies are an effective measure to increase the level of adoption. Subsidising one side of the identity system raises the number of participants on the subsidised side, which makes the identity system more attractive for the other side. The Identity Provider can offset the costs of the subsidies in one market by higher demand and profit on the other side of the market. But who to subsidise? The optimal pricing strategy in a twosided market is still being debated among economists. In principle, the less price-sensitive actor group should be charged a higher price to the benefit of the more pricesensitive market side. The challenge lies in reliably determining the price elasticity of the different actor groups and their willingness to pay.

However, findings from the rather unsuccessful digital identity project SuisseID permit preliminary inferences about how to design a more effective pricing strategy for a Swiss digital identity solution. In the case of SuisseID, the traditional pricing logic was applied to a two-sided market without considering the interdependencies between Identity Owners and Relying Parties. After an initial phase with state subsidies, Identity Owners had to pay a registration fee as well as an annual user fee. The registration costs made the ecosystem unattractive for new users, while the majority of existing users were not willing to renew their subscription.

Hence, a successful digital identity ecosystem in Switzerland should provide free digital identities to Identity Owners and base the business case on fees from the Relying Parties and additional services. Especially in the ecosystem’s early stages, monetary incentives for Relying Parties in the form of discounts are also advisable to create momentum.

Another effective strategy to overcome the “chicken-andegg problem” is to attract high-value users first. In the case of digital identity systems, onboarding high-value Relying Parties such as large banks, telecommunication or e-commerce companies can significantly increase a digital identity’s overall attractiveness for Identity Owners, as they can use it more broadly. Once the Identity Owner is accustomed to using their digital identity when interacting with these high-value Relying Parties, they expect the same level of convenience from other companies too, which creates competitive pressure for other Relying Parties to follow suit.

While adopting eID yields many benefits for Relying Parties, it is vital to smooth their transition into Switzerland’s emerging digital identity ecosystem by lowering the technical and operational entry barriers. This is particularly important in the case of small or mid-sized public or private organisations lacking the capabilities and/or resources for a large-scale digital identity implementation project. The onboarding of Relying Parties should follow a streamlined process and leverage an existing contractual framework. From a technical perspective, a broker intermediating Relying Parties and Identity Providers can ease technical integration in times of scarce IT resources. Instead of being required to build interfaces to multiple Identity Providers, the broker serves as the single point of contact for the Relying Party.

One of the most effective strategies to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem is to tap into an existing pool of users. Today, most Identity Owners already have (multiple) digital identities that could potentially be leveraged to minimise the effort to obtain an eID.